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Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not sufficiently restrict which account a certificate could be assigned to. This could allow an attacker to associate a certificate with another user's account, affecting the confidentiality and integrity of that account's encrypted mail and, where certificate-based login is enabled, potentially permitting unauthorized access to the account.

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) weakness in Kiteworks Core could allow an unauthenticated attacker to store crafted content that later executes arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated session of an administrator who views the affected page. This could have permitted the attacker to gain full administrative control, including the creation of a new administrative account.

An authenticated Email Protection Gateway administrator holding only limited, delegated permissions could write files with attacker-controlled content to arbitrary locations accessible to the Email Protection Gateway service account. This exceeds the administrator's intended privileges and could be used to alter application files and configuration or to disrupt the availability of the service.

An authenticated administrator could cause the server to issue requests to, and interact with, internal network services that are not meant to be reachable through this interface. On its own this did not result in code execution.

A resource exhaustion vulnerability in Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway allowed an unauthenticated remote attacker to repeatedly trigger a comparatively expensive server-side operation, causing a partial denial of service.

An unauthenticated attacker could cause a file with attacker-controlled content to be written to the appliance filesystem through an administrative upload handler that did not properly authenticate the request. This did not by itself result in code execution, which would require a separate vulnerability to place the file in an executable location.

A system notification template on the Kiteworks appliance was rendered by a template engine that evaluated expressions contained in the stored template body. An authenticated System Administrator could potentially store a crafted template that executed operating-system commands on the appliance when the notification was next sent.

Two Kiteworks Core cluster-management operations did not validate file paths supplied to them, so an attacker holding root on one node of a cluster could write files as root onto another node and cause them to be executed there. Exploitation requires backend root access on a cluster node and a pending software patch present on the target node.

An authenticated administrator could initiate an administrative import using a file whose contents were not fully verified, because the import validated only the file's header rather than the complete file. This could allow unverified or forged content to be accepted and processed, affecting the integrity of the imported data.

An authorization check in the large file exchange feature of Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not correctly establish that the requesting user was a party to the package being requested. An authenticated user of that optional feature could read the subject, message body, and attachments of packages they neither sent nor received.

An authenticated administrator on a node with an optional, separately licensed gateway role enabled could supply a connector URL that the server retrieved without sufficient validation of its scheme or destination, causing the server to issue requests to internal network services. Exploitation requires the licensed gateway role to be active.

An authenticated administrator could bypass the content validation applied to an administrative file upload and store a file containing dangerous content on the appliance. This did not by itself result in code execution, which would require a separate vulnerability to run the stored file.

In multi-node deployments, an attacker who had already obtained code execution on one appliance node could submit a value through an internal cluster interface that was written into monitoring configuration on another node without sufficient validation, potentially allowing OS commands to be executed there. Execution was limited to an unprivileged service account on that node.

On a Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway cluster with database replication enabled, a party trusted by the cluster could submit a crafted serialized object that was deserialized without sufficient validation, potentially allowing code execution as the gateway service account. Replication is disabled by default, and exploitation requires control of a trusted cluster peer or administrative access to the appliance.

Kiteworks Core did not apply its gateway-level API security controls to every request authenticated through the platform's central authentication service. An authenticated user could reach REST API functionality over a request path on which those controls, including enforcement of signed-out and revoked sessions, were not applied.

An optional, separately licensed repository-connector feature in Kiteworks Core did not neutralize special characters in a user-supplied path before passing it to an external command. An authenticated system administrator could inject additional commands and write arbitrary content to files owned by the service account running the connector, enabling code execution in that account's context; exploitation additionally requires network egress from the appliance to a system under the attacker's control.

An administrative import function in Kiteworks Core did not verify that the requesting administrator was entitled to create the privileged integration credential being imported. A delegated administrator holding a single narrowly scoped administrative permission could therefore obtain full system administrator privileges, without any action by an existing system administrator.

Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway rejected certain configuration settings, but its validation did not recognize every form in which they could be supplied. An authenticated administrator could potentially use an unrecognized form to have a file of their choosing written to the gateway and executed, resulting in code execution as the gateway service account.

Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not sufficiently validate the content of an uploaded backup, and allowed an administrator to influence how the application loaded it. An authenticated administrator could potentially use this to execute arbitrary code on the gateway as the underlying service account.

A user-provisioning interface in Kiteworks Core did not verify that the requesting administrator was entitled to grant the role being assigned. An administrator whose delegated permissions covered role changes alone could therefore raise an account to full system-administrator privileges.

An identity-verification weakness in Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway allowed the gateway to act on the Kiteworks platform on behalf of a user it had not authenticated, and to provision a platform account for an identity it did not already know. A remote, unauthenticated sender could potentially exploit this to obtain control of a platform account.

An XML parser used by Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not restrict external entity references. Where an optional, non-default message-processing feature is enabled, a remote and unauthenticated sender could potentially use a crafted message to read files accessible to the gateway service account, including cryptographic key material and credentials, and have them sent to a destination they control.

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) weakness in Kiteworks Core could allow an administrator holding only a single, narrowly scoped delegated permission to store crafted content that later executes arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated session of a System Administrator who views the affected page. This could have permitted the lower-privileged administrator to escalate to full administrative control of the tenant, including the creation of a new administrative account.

The sandbox that isolates document conversion on a Kiteworks appliance did not fully confine the code running inside it. Code already executing within that sandbox could potentially escape its confinement and act with the privileges of the service account that runs the application, which could allow an attacker in that position to read or modify application data and configuration, or to disrupt the service on the affected appliance.